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This paper addresses the theoretical relevance of monophyletic, paraphyletic and polyphyletic groups under the
paradigm of sophisticated scientiﬁc realism. The doctrine of metaphysical realism is introduced using the philosophy of
Karl Popper as an example, which is then contrasted with scientiﬁc realism. A discussion of the nature of causal
relations presents an account of counterfactual conditionals. The current state of art casts the theory of phylogenetic
systematics in a stark contrast of classes (universals) and individuals (particulars). In practice, however, individuals
piggyback on classes, or sets. Natural kinds are introduced in order to overcome this deep dichotomy. The theoretical
relevance of natural kinds lies in their explanatory value, and that may change with changing context. It is for this
reason that non-monophyletic groups can have explanatory value (their members can function as tokens of causally
relevant kinds) within certain domains of evolutionary biology. Explanatory value is maximized by integration of the
genealogical hierarchy of species and monophyletic taxa with other areas of evolutionary biology.
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In his inﬂuential book, Hennig (1966, p. 146) drew
attention to the distinction of monophyletic from
paraphyletic and polyphyletic groups, and concluded:
‘‘The paraphyletic groups (as also the polyphyletic ones)
are distinguished from the monophyletic ones essentially
by the fact that they have no independent history and
thus possess neither reality, nor individuality. They have
no ancestor in common only to them, and thus also no
point of origin in time in common only to them in the
true historical course of phylogeny’’. This is a complex
quote that deserves careful unpacking to make apparente front matter r 2005 Gesellschaft fu¨r Biologische Systemat
e.2004.03.003
665 7630; fax: +1 312 665 7641.
ss: orieppel@ﬁeldmuseum.org (O. Rieppel).the multiple issues embedded in it: a distinction of
monophyly from paraphyly and polyphyly, the ontolo-
gical issues of reality and individuality, and ﬁnally an
appeal to truth in the context of an assumption of the
‘true historical course of phylogeny’. Similar ontological
commitments pervade the literature on phylogenetic
systematics. A small sample will have to do in this
context. ‘‘The taxa placed in the systematization are real
reﬂections of living Nature and not y arbitrary
creations of the human spirit y species and mono-
phyletic supraspeciﬁc taxa are equivalents of unities in
Nature, having reality and individuality’’ (Ax, 1987,
p. 10). ‘‘Therefore, species are groups of populations
which are reproductively isolated from other such
groups. Only in that sense are species (hypothetical-)
real entities’’ (Willmann, 1985, p. 17). ‘‘Systematists whoik. Published by Elsevier Gmbh. All rights reserved.
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other types of species) are realists. I prefer the realism
approach for systematics because it assumes that there
are real patterns to be discovered in nature which can be
used to study real processes’’ (Wiley, 1981, p.17).
Most systematists are realists in some form or
another, as is reﬂected in these quotes; some of the
authors quoted above speak of reality and truth
straightforwardly, others acknowledge some gap be-
tween their words and the physical world as they appeal
to ‘equivalents’ of real entities of nature or ‘(hypothe-
tical-) real entities’. In this contribution I will ﬁrst try to
clarify what a realist philosophy of science implies. I will
then try to show that paraphyly and polyphyly can be
reduced to one another such that the distinction I will
pursue in this paper is that of monophyly versus non-
monophyly. I will then try to introduce some very basic
aspects of natural-kind terms in an attempt to overcome
the gridlock of contrasting classes versus individuals,
universals versus particulars, in the discussion of the
‘natural groups’ that are the objects of investigation of
biosystematics.Discussion
Metaphysical realism, scientiﬁc realism, and the
world around us
One of the more widely known realist philosophers of
science, and one that also had an important inﬂuence on
the theory of systematics through secondary sources,
was Karl Popper (1996; for an account of the relation-
ship of Popper’s philosophy to realism and systematics
see Rieppel, 2003a, b, 2004a; for an explicit appeal in
systematics to logical empiricism as expounded by
Popper see Wiley, 1981, p. 19). Schmitt (2001, p. 343),
for example, applauds the fact that Hennig transformed
systematics from ‘‘a skill or an art to a truly scientiﬁc
method, which justly found its place in hypothetico-
deductive science such as the one sketched by Popper’’.
But what exactly does Popper (1996, 80f) mean when he
writes: ‘‘I believe in metaphysical realism’’, yet ‘‘meta-
physical realism is nowhere used to support any of the
solutions proposed in’’ his ﬁrst published book, The
Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery? As its (more appropriate)
German title indicates, this book (Popper, 1976) deals
with the logic of scientiﬁc investigation, i.e., more
precisely, with the logic of falsiﬁcation, the logic of
scientiﬁc theories, and that of scientiﬁc explanation.
Metaphysical realism starts with the assumption of a
world of physical objects and events, which exist
independent of mind and discourse. In Hennig’s (1966,
p. 80) words: ‘‘the [phylogenetic] relations exist whether
they are recognized or not’’. But, for Popper (1988,p. 55), it is not this world of physical objects and events
that obeys the laws of logic, as Hennig thought (Rieppel,
2003c). Instead, it is our language, our talk about nature
with laws of nature as its objects that obeys the laws of
logic or ﬂouts them (Dummett, 1993, p. 2).
At the heart of Popper’s metaphysical realism lies the
correspondence relation between words and the world:
the truth of a statement is thereby conceptualized as a
‘‘two-place correspondence relation between a symbol
(or a string of symbols such as a sentence) and the thing
it symbolizes’’ (Salerno, 2001, p. 59). But realism based
on the correspondence relation has a metaphysical
component, because our statements about the physical
world will always remain separated from it by a logical
gap (Ko¨rner, 1970). It is for this reason that metaphy-
sical realism faces the problem that ‘‘even a hypothetical
ideal theory might be false, or incomplete’’ (Haack,
1998, p. 189; see also Devitt, 1997, p. 224; Maitra, 2003,
p. 34). Consequently, metaphysical realism cannot
afford an epistemic notion of truth, but must adopt a
non-epistemic (Rieppel, 2003a) or ‘‘recognition-trans-
cendent’’ (Maitra, 2003, p. 69) concept of truth.
Realists talk about the truth conditions, and truth
values, of statements (propositions). The truth condition
speciﬁes under which conditions a statement would be
true; the truth value speciﬁes whether a statement is true
or false under those conditions. ‘‘A statement is true if
and only if it corresponds to the facts. This, as Tarski
points out, is an objectivist or absolutist notion of
truth’’ (Popper, 1973, p. 46). But facts are not objects; to
talk about facts or states of affairs is already to have
categorized the world (Luntley, 1999, p. 62; Green,
2001, p. 76). Facts are complex entities, which subsist
timelessly, regardless of whether they are thought of by
anybody at any time (for Hennig, phylogenetic relations
existed ‘‘irrespective of whether there is a human being
which observes and cognizes them’’; Hennig, 1957,
p. 57). Truth is timeless, and for that reason facts must
be timeless, too. As Wittgenstein famously said: ‘‘The
world is the totality of facts, not of objects’’, a statement
which Glock (2000, p. 115) identiﬁed as the ‘‘climax of a
realist tradition’’, which considers facts as ‘‘mind-
independent constituents of the world’’.
The correspondence relation here employed in the
service of truth (in Tarski’s sense) speciﬁes truth
conditions only, not how any empirical statement could
be proven to be true. Tarski’s notion of truth says or
explains nothing about the physical world, which is why
some ﬁnd it incomplete (Tarski’s theory of truth has no
explanatory power; Taylor, 1998). Instead, Tarski’s
(1944, after Tarski, 2001) interest was the conditions
under which the truth predicate ‘y is true’ could be
applied to a sentence. Consider the statement: ‘‘‘Snow is
white’ is true if and only if snow is white’’. This only says
that the truth predicate ‘y is true’ applies to the
sentence ‘Snow is white’ if and only if snow is white.
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allow us to establish, empirically, that snow is in fact
white. Tarski was interested in the meaning of the truth
predicate ‘y is true’, not in the meaning of the sentence
‘Snow is white’ (Putnam, 1996). Tarski’s is a semantic
theory of truth, not a theory by which to prove the truth
of empirical statements.
Metaphysical realism evidently is a bit of a lofty affair
that reaches beyond The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery.
Its home is Popper’s famous ‘world 3’ (see Rieppel,
2003a), a world populated, inter alia, by timeless
propositions with their logical properties and relations
(Haack, 1998). Scientiﬁc realism is more down to earth,
as it seeks causal explanations that apply to our world of
experience. This requires the rational justiﬁcation of
knowledge claims about the world of physical objects
and events, which includes an epistemic project that
attempts to bridge the (logical) gap between words and
things (Kirkham, 2001). A scientiﬁc realist will commit
to approximate truth only, in the sense that a scientiﬁc
theory is aligned with the causal structures of the
physical world at best in a relevant and approximately
true sense: the truth predicate deployed in scientiﬁc
realism is not ‘y is true’, but ‘y is relevantly
approximately true’ (Boyd, 1999). For example, the fact
that airplanes crash relatively infrequently is taken as an
indication that our aerodynamic laws are ‘approxi-
mately relevantly true’. A second commitment of a
scientiﬁc realist is the ﬁrm rejection of ontological
pluralism: there is one, and only one, world the causal
structures of which are approximately and relevantly
captured by our scientiﬁc theories. Scientiﬁc realism
appears to most closely approach the common sense
view, but it also has its problems. Criticism centers on
the notion of ‘approximate truth’, and the fact that it
piggybacks on ‘success’ in science, both notions being
difﬁcult to deﬁne (Laudan, 2002).
An issue relevant for systematics with respect to the
ontological monism required by scientiﬁc realism is the
complementarity of pattern versus process explanations
(see the discussions in Rieppel, 2003c; West-Eberhard,
2003, p. 83). Another issue discussed more fully below is
the question whether non-monophyletic (paraphyletic,
polyphyletic) groups should be recognized as having
theoretical (explanatory) relevance in certain domains of
evolutionary biology but not in others. Sophisticated
scientiﬁc realism accommodates such difﬁculties by
emphasizing the context dependence of theoretical
relevance and scientiﬁc explanation (McMullin, 2002,
p. 252).Monophyly, paraphyly, and polyphyly
Hennig (1966, p. 146) distinguished monophyletic
groups (deﬁned on the basis of synapomorphy) fromparaphyletic (deﬁned on the basis of symplesiomorphy)
and polyphyletic (deﬁned on the basis of convergence)
ones. Agnathans would be paraphyletic on the basis of
the plesiomorphic absence of a synapomorphy of
gnathostomes, i.e. the jaws; anamniotes are paraphyletic
because they lack the amnion. Paraphyly, in contrast to
polyphyly, thus invokes the old Platonic concept of the
logical subdivision of the world into ‘A groups’ and
‘Not-A groups’ (Eldredge and Cracraft, 1980), where
not-A groups correspond to Hennig’s ‘Restko¨rper’
(Schmitt, 2001, p. 331). If the largely futile (Keller,
et al., 2003) contemporary discussion on the ‘correct
deﬁnition’ of taxon names has any merit, it is to have
brought out the distinction of apomorphy-based, node-
based and stem-based deﬁnitions of taxa (rather than
their names). Apomorphy-based or, more generally,
character-based ‘deﬁnitions’ of taxa have been rejected
by bionominalists who, with Hennig (1950, 1966),
consider species and monophyletic taxa to be spatio-
temporally restricted individuals (see below for more
details). In their view, character-based deﬁnitions of
taxa constitute an intensional deﬁnition of a class, i.e. an
abstract entity (more on that below), whereas the
ontological commitment to a reality and individuality
of taxa derives from their status as spatio-temporally
constrained chunks of the genealogical nexus (e.g.
Ghiselin, 1974, 1997; Frost and Kluge, 1994). Hennig
distinguished ‘characters’ from ‘character conditions’
that result from transformation (Hennig, 1966, p. 89),
and he took those to be merely indicators (Hennig, 1950,
p. 26; 1966, p. 80) that mark out groups such as
monophyletic, paraphyletic and polyphyletic ones. But
his claim of reality and individuality of monophyletic
groups is based on their historical continuity and spatio-
temporal restrictedness, not on possession of necessary
and sufﬁcient properties. For this reason, the deﬁnition
of paraphyletic and polyphyletic groups on the basis of
characters (symplesiomorphy and convergence, respec-
tively) needs to be contrasted with a deﬁnition on the
basis of genealogy: a paraphyletic group is one that
includes some, but not all, descendants of a common
ancestor, whereas a polyphyletic group includes descen-
dents from two or more different ancestors.
The problem of an empirical distinction between
polyphyletic and paraphyletic groups lies in the nature
of character statements. We do not ﬁnd characters or
character states labeled as either symplesiomorphic,
synapomorphic, or convergent. Primarily, character
statements predicate properties of particular organisms
and their parts. Whether these properties, instantiated
by particular organisms or their parts (Mahner and
Bunge, 1997), are revealed as symplesiomorphic, syna-
pomorphic or convergent, and at which level of the
hierarchy, results from their analysis relative to a
hierarchy, where the goal of the analysis is to maximize
the relations of inclusion and exclusion but to minimize
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marked out by the predicates that are deployed in
character statements (parsimony analysis under the ‘test
of congruence’; Patterson, 1982). The distinction be-
tween monophyly, paraphyly and polyphyly therefore
will be possible only in relation to a given hierarchy, not
in relation to character statements per se. In terms of the
genealogical hierarchy, paraphyly and polyphyly reduce
to non-monophyly as one moves between levels of
greater or lesser inclusiveness: what is polyphyletic at a
level of lesser inclusiveness turns paraphyletic at a level
of greater inclusiveness.
For Hennig (1950, 1966) ‘naturalness’, i.e. reality and
individuality of groups (taxa), obtains only with respect
to their history, not with respect to the shared derived
characters, which he considered merely to be ‘‘aids used
to apprehend’’ their history (Hennig, 1966, p. 80;
‘‘Steckbriefmerkmale’’ in Hennig, 1957, p. 52). Under
that paradigm, paraphyletic and polyphyletic groups
cannot be ‘natural’, or real, but are sets, or classes
deﬁned by some set of character statements. Para- and
polyphyletic groups reduce to nothing more than
‘unnatural’, ‘artiﬁcial’ groups that have no basis in
history (genealogy, phylogeny).
In the following sections of this contribution I want to
bring out more clearly the stark contrast between sets or
classes as universals and particulars (individuals) that
alone can claim reality, a contrast that has dominated
discussions of the theory of phylogenetic systematics but
that has been identiﬁed as ‘‘an outdated remnant of
early logical positivism’’ by Keller et al. (2003, p. 94; for
an account of the positivist background in Hennig’s
work see Rieppel, 2003c).Causality and natural laws
Hennig (1950, p. 5, 23) denied a difference between
‘object’ and ‘event’, since ‘natural things’ (‘‘Naturgegen-
sta¨nde’’) are nothing but a system of causes. Objects are
generally thought of as particulars (individuals) that
occupy a particular time-space region. Events are
generally thought ‘‘to occur, to happen, or to take
place’’ in time (Casati and Varzi, 2002, p. 2), with
objects being involved in them. Hennig (1950, 1966, p. 6)
complained that systematists did not take into account
the ‘‘four-dimensional continuum of space and time’’
(see discussion in Rieppel, 2003c), but with objects
extending across space and time, ‘‘no metaphysically
signiﬁcant distinction between objects and events’’
obtains any more (Casati and Varzi, 2002, p. 2). In
any case, both objects and events are usually con-
ceptualized as individuals (Casati and Varzi, 2002), such
that ‘‘causation is a relation between events and y
events are particulars’’ (Evnine, 1991, p. 34). But what is
a causal relation, causality, or even a natural law?Hume is famous for having conceptualized causal
relations in terms of constant conjunction: ‘‘we may
deﬁne a cause to be an object, followed by another, and
where all objects similar to the ﬁrst are followed by
objects similar to the second’’ (Hume, cited in Evnine,
1991, p. 36). So the constant conjunction of event a and
event b reveals an underlying causal relation, or, in other
words, the causal relation is what explains the fact that
event a is always followed by event b. If, indeed, event a
is always followed by event b, it is possible to invoke
lawful regularity, i.e. a causal law that explains why
event a is always followed by event b (or conversely, one
may invoke a natural law and proceed to test it by
deriving from it implications or deductions). Causal
laws are meant to be explanatory, but ‘‘causal explana-
tions are sensitive to how events are described’’ (Evnine,
1991, p. 35). This reveals the linguistic nature of causal
laws. Under the realist paradigm, causality is a relation
that obtains between events independent of mind and
discourse, but causal explanation can only be obtained
in the domain of discourse. Causal laws are instantiated
by events when these are described in certain ways but
not in others (Evnine, 1991, p. 36). A mere description
of the movements of red and blue billiard balls will not
instantiate the laws of mechanics, only a description of
those movements in terms of bodies with a certain mass
and shape, moving with a certain velocity etc., will. So,
in order to capture the causal relations of phylogeny,
these have to be described in the appropriate way, and
for Hennig (1957, 1966) this was in terms of Gregg’s
(1954) language of taxonomy (see Rieppel, 2003c for
discussion).
A universally constant conjunction of events will be
explained by a universal law. A common form of
expressing universal lawfulness are universally quanti-
ﬁed conditionals, e.g.: ‘(For all x) If x is a piece of
magnetized iron, then x will attract iron ﬁlings’. The
problem only is, as has been noted by Balashov and
Rosenberg (2002, p. 41), that such grammatical condi-
tions ‘‘are not sufﬁcient to distinguish laws from other
statements that are grammatically similar to laws but
without the explanatory force’’. Their example can be
paraphrased in terms of two universally quantiﬁed
conditionals: (i) ‘(For all x) If x is a solid spherical
mass of pure plutonium, then x weighs less than 100,000
kilograms’, and (ii) ‘(For all x) If x is a solid spherical
mass of pure gold, then x weighs less than 100,000
kilograms’. From this example we may conclude that
statement (i) is necessarily true, because quantities of
plutonium explode before reaching that mass, whereas
statement (ii) is true only contingently. There may not
exist a sphere of gold that weighs more than 100,000 kg
in our world of experience, but it is not impossible that
one could exist. However, whether or not it does exist is
not a question of natural lawfulness, but only a question
of resources and technology. This example forces upon
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ful) regularity (conjunction of events) and merely
contingent, i.e. accidental regularity. But given this
distinction, how would it be possible to assert that a
singular causal claim of the type ‘a causes b’ instantiates
some lawful connectedness?
For one way to tackle this problem some authors look
back on Hume’s deﬁnition of cause as cited above, to
which Hume added: ‘‘Or in other words, where, if the
ﬁrst object had not been, the second never had existed’’
(Menzies, 2001, p. 1). The idea, therefore, is to express
causal laws not in the indicative mood in which they are
usually expressed, but in the subjunctive mood. Sub-
junctive conditionals may yield what are known as
counterfactual conditionals (Lewis, 2000), and the idea
is that natural laws do, contingent regularity does not,
support counterfactual conditionals. To return to the
example provided by Balashov and Rosenberg (2002, p.
42), we can say: (i) ‘If it were the case that the moon
were made up of pure plutonium, then it would weigh
less than 100,000 kilograms’, and (ii) ‘If it were the case
that the moon were made up of pure gold, then it would
weigh less than 100,000 kilograms’. These subjunctive
conditionals do not render actual, but only possible
states of affairs. In any world that is subject to the same
causal laws that govern the natural course of events in
our actual world, we would recognize statement (i) as
supported, statement (ii) as not supported. Causal laws
are thus found to support their counterfactuals, or to
have counterfactual force. But counterfactuals have the
property (which is unpleasant for realists of naturalistic
inclination; Quine, 2001b) that they require trips on
‘‘transworld airlines’’ (Sober, 1981, p. 170): it is in a
possible world only, different from ours, that the moon
could be made of plutonium or gold. This example
invokes the distinction (Kirkham, 2001) of the actual
world which we experience, possible natural worlds
(‘twin worlds’) which obey the same causal laws and
laws of logic as the actual world, and any possible
worlds which obey the laws of logic only but not
(necessarily) the causal laws as we know them.
The notion of universal natural laws has come under
criticism for being too strong to be applicable to the
actual world. If, indeed, the universe has come into
existence at some point in time and has been evolving
since then, there cannot be truly universal laws. Mahner
and Bunge (1997) talk about ‘bounded’ universal laws
that do make universal generalizations but with limited
scope. For example: ‘All ﬁshes in this pond are infected
with XYZ’ does not generalize over ﬁshes in other
bodies of water. Accordingly, Mahner and Bunge (1997,
p. 221) concluded that ‘‘naturalness comes in degrees’’,
which means that naturalness, as measured by the
counterfactual force of propositions about nature,
comes in degrees (see also Grifﬁths, 1999). Although
Hennig, (1950, 1966, p. 3) considered systematics anomothetic, i.e. generalizing science, he (Hennig, 1950,
303ff) followed a widespread convention that distin-
guished a law (without exceptions) from a rule (allowing
for exceptions). This means that the regularities that
empirical sciences have to deal with are often less than
perfect or universal, most of the time only probable to a
greater or lesser degree. Causal relations that empirical
sciences have to deal with are often not of a near-
universal type, but more often probabilistic, and this is
particularly true of evolutionary biology (Kitcher, 1993;
Rosenberg, 1994).Classes, sets, and individuals
The discussion of the theory of phylogenetic systema-
tics has been caught in the age-old dichotomy between
classes and individuals, universals and particulars.
Hennig already laid the groundwork for this dichotomy,
as he considered set theory the adequate tool for the
systematization of biodiversity (Hennig, 1953, p. 6,
1957, p. 56, 1966), yet considered species and mono-
phyletic taxa as individuals (Hennig, 1950, 1966). This
dichotomy is unlikely to be very helpful or applicable to
the world of experience because of its black-and-white
contrast.
Here, I will use ‘class’ and ‘set’ as broadly synon-
ymous, although some (e.g., Mahner and Bunge, 1997)
prefer ‘classes’ to be intensionally deﬁned, ‘sets’ to be
extensionally deﬁned (as they are in traditional set
theory). Classes, or sets, are universals, and as such (in
the tradition of nominalism) abstract ‘entities’ without
spatio-temporal extension. They can be deﬁned exten-
sionally, i.e. through a potentially inﬁnite list of all their
members, or intensionally. An intensional deﬁnition is
given in terms of a list of individually necessary and
jointly sufﬁcient (essential) properties that constitute the
criteria of membership for the class. In intensional
deﬁnitions, properties are rendered as predicates. In
other words, the extension of a predicate is the class (or
set) of all elements (objects) to which the predicate
truthfully applies. A class (set) can also be deﬁned
ostensively, through a gesture pointing at a paradig-
matic (standard) member of the set, accompanied by the
deployment of a statement of similarity (predicate), and/
or by a generalizing sentence such as ‘and all similar
things’. A few things are important to remember with
respect to classes or sets. First, the ontology of classes or
sets is the membership relation (an element is a member
in the class, or set). Second, the properties predicated
upon a class of elements by an intensional deﬁnition are
semantically tied (Schwartz, 1979; according to Keller et
al., 2003 analytically tied, or tied a priori) to the general
noun that names the class. The meaning of those
predicates is rooted in semantics (i.e. in the way the
predicates are used in a linguistic community), not in
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bachelors are unmarried men’ is true by virtue of the
fact that the expressions ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’
share the same meaning. For this reason, the statement
also cannot undergo empirical revision, nor can inten-
sional deﬁnitions of classes (unless a change of meaning
is accepted). Third, sets in traditional extensional set
theory have their members essentially (see Lewis, 2002,
for a different view). If a set is deﬁned by its extension,
i.e. by the totality of its members, and it has these
members essentially, then it no longer is the same set if
even only one member is removed. One might con-
ceptualize a species in a continental setting as a set. If
even a single gravid female of that species became
reproductively isolated from other members of its
species, for example through passive dispersal to a
remote island where it founded a daughter population,
then the mother species would not remain the same (a
surviving ancestral species), but would become a
different species, i.e. the sister-species of the newly
founded one. Problems that result from the application
of set theory to species were further discussed in Rieppel
(2003c) and the references cited therein.
In contrast to classes, or sets, individuals are
particular objects or bodies with spatio-temporal exten-
sion. By virtue of the latter they are considered ‘real’,
rather than abstract, entities. They are designated
(denoted) by singular terms (proper names or deﬁnite
descriptions). The meaning (at least in part) of proper
names, i.e. the way proper names are used, is to pick out
individuals. If sets or classes are abstract entities, they
cannot be picked out by a proper name (this argument
neglects the problem of empty proper names that refer
to abstract entities such as ‘Santa Claus’). Individuals
can be members of classes, or sets, but the ontology of
individuals is not the membership relation, but the part-
to-whole relation (mereological inclusion). The paradig-
matic individual for biology is the individual organism,
the cells of which are its parts. Or, the other way around,
a zygote is an individual which through cell division
forms a more complex individual of which the cells are
parts.
Bionominalism is the name for the school of thought
that treats species as individuals (Ghiselin, 1974; for a
recent summary and references see Hull, 1999; for a
recent critique see Mahner and Bunge, 1997; LaPorte,
2004). On account of their spatio-temporal restricted-
ness and internal cohesiveness, as well as on account of
their function (Rosenberg, 1994) as replicators and
interactors (Hull, 1988; for discussion see Sterelny and
Grifﬁths, 1999), species are said to be individuals, i.e.
individual chunks of the genealogical nexus located in
space and time. Many people have problems accepting a
population, or a species, as an individual. Indeed, a
species cannot be an individual of the same kind as an
individual organism. Quine (2001a; for discussion seeSober, 1981, and Evnine, 1991, p. 29) proposed an
ontology of individuals (particulars) that distinguishes
between what he called ‘body’ and ‘object’. An
individual has spatio-temporal extension, and thus can
be conceptualized as the sum of its space-time slices (as
Hennig did with his concept of the ‘semaphoront’;
Rieppel, 2003c). For bodies Quine postulated that these
space-time slices overlap (endurance sensu Lewis, 2002),
but objects may form individuals no matter how
dissociated and scattered the space-time slices are
(perdurance sensu Lewis, 2002). Adapting this distinc-
tion to a discussion of species, it can be said that for
bodies there obtains temporal and spatial overlap of
space-time slices, whereas for objects the overlap can be
either spatial or temporal. So, the individual organisms
would qualify as bodies in Quine’s ontology, whereas
species qua individuals qualify as objects: ‘‘We should
think of Hull and Ghiselin as having shown that species
are historical objects’’ (K. Sterelny, cited in LaPorte,
2004, p. 176).
The reason that the black-and-white contrast between
sets, or classes, and individuals is not very helpful in the
empirical world of systematists is that it threatens to
trap reasoning in a category mistake. Hennig (1950, p.
26) was clear on the fact that, as far as his research
program was concerned, the hierarchy of groups within
groups was based on morphology. But morphological
characters (properties instantiated by the organisms or
their parts; Mahner and Bunge, 1997) mark out sets, and
the ontology of sets is the membership relation. Going
from there, Hennig (1950, p. 26) requested a change of
meaning for that hierarchy of groups within groups, as it
should be read as a genealogical hierarchy, the ontology
of which is the part-to-whole relation (mereological
inclusion). But this entails that the genealogical hier-
archy is parasitic on the morphological hierarchy
(Dupre´, 1981). Individuals piggyback on sets (Rieppel,
2003c), but for this to be possible, an ontological
pluralism (speciﬁcally: dualism) is required (Dupre´,
1993), something that is not acceptable under the
paradigm of realism (Hull, 1999).
Some systematists, those who choose to follow the
‘PhyloCode’ (Cantino and deQueiroz, 2003, p. 23), are
discarding morphology (except in apomorphy-based
deﬁnitions) as a criterion to deﬁne taxa, which instead
are deﬁned by reference to their ancestry alone, but the
category mistake persists (Keller et al., 2003). Consider
the following: ‘‘common ancestry is one criterion that is
both necessary and sufﬁcient for membership in a
monophyletic taxon’’ (Rowe, 1987, p. 208). Thus, a
monophyletic taxon is a class the members of which
share the necessary and sufﬁcient (i.e. essential) property
of a speciﬁc ancestry (usually formulated as ‘the most
recent common ancestor of A and B, and all of its
descendants’). But phylogenetic systematists conceptua-
lize taxa as individuals with parts (e.g., Rowe, 1987,
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taxa have been deﬁned as classes of organisms that share
a common evolutionary origin shows that they cannot
be individuals. But if these taxa are chunks of the
genealogical nexus, they also cannot be abstract, time-
less sets or classes. What, then, are they?Natural kinds
One way out of this conundrum is an appeal for
natural kinds, at least in the modern concept of this term
(Boyd, 1999; Grifﬁths, 1999; Wilson, 1999; Keller et al.,
2003; Rieppel, 2004b). Natural-kind talk has attracted a
lot of interest and generated a vast literature (e.g.,
LaPorte, 2004). An excellent introduction to the topic is
provided by Pessin and Goldberg (1996). A ‘natural
kind’ is deﬁned as the ‘stuff’ and the ‘things’ that occur
in nature (Honderich, 1995). Water, gold and diamonds
are stuff that exists in nature; poplars, elm trees and
tigers are things that exist in nature. The essential aspect
of natural kinds is that their members or parts play a
role in causal processes, which in turn endows natural-
kind terms with counterfactual force. In the classical
concept of natural kinds, e.g. the one held by John
Locke, these were treated very much as sets, or classes,
of ‘stuff’ and ‘things’ that exist in nature, and that are
subject to universal laws (Ayers, 1981; Hacking, 1991a).
However, such concepts have been replaced more
recently by one of ‘homeostatic property cluster natural
kinds’ (Boyd, 1999; Grifﬁths, 1999; Wilson, 1999, Keller
et al., 2003).
As explained above, the intensional deﬁnition of a
class predicates properties of its elements that are
semantically (analytically, a priori) tied to the general
noun that names the class. This is well exempliﬁed by
the intensional deﬁnition of the class of all unicorns
(e.g., ‘horse-like animals with a horn on their forehead’),
which yields a logically perfectly valid class, but one that
is empirically empty. In contrast, natural kinds are
marked out by causal properties of the individuals that
are its members or parts. In other words, its underlying
causal properties render an individual an instantiation,
i.e. a token of a natural kind. The causal properties that
determine the nature of a kind can be, and constantly
are, subject to empirical revision (Schwartz, 1979;
LaPorte, 2004). This difference is important. Consider
the class of ravens intensionally deﬁned as being black
(in conjunction with other properties that distinguish
ravens from other black birds). The predicate ‘y is
black’ is semantically attached to the term ‘raven’. The
standard example of falsiﬁcationism is that the observa-
tion of a single white raven would sufﬁce to falsify the
statement ‘All ravens are black’. But if to be black is
part of an intensional deﬁnition of the class of all ravens,
i.e. if the predicate ‘y is black’ is semantically(analytically, a priori; Keller et al., 2003) attached to
the general term ‘raven’, then a white bird simply cannot
be a member in the class of all ravens, and hence cannot
falsify ‘All ravens are black’. However, empirically it can
be the case that we observe an albino raven, and if we
agree on such an observation and accept it, then the
statement that ‘All ravens are black’ will be falsiﬁed. If
ravens form a natural kind, then the criteria for being a
member or part of that natural kind can be revised a
posteriori, as a result of empirical investigation. And if
ravens form a homeostatic property cluster natural kind,
then this kind will naturally accommodate the occa-
sional albino.
In the case of an intensionally deﬁned class, the
deﬁning properties are individually necessary and jointly
sufﬁcient for membership in that class. In other words:
the class has these properties essentially. This is not the
case for homeostatic property cluster natural kinds,
which have been characterized as subject to Wittgen-
steinian family resemblance (Wilson, 1999; see Glock,
2000 for a discussion of family resemblance, and
Hacking, 1991b for a dissenting view). The members
or parts of a property cluster natural kind must share
some, but need not share all, of a cluster of properties in
a variable, yet overlapping pattern. Yet ‘‘these proper-
ties need not hold a priori of the kind; later empirical
investigation may establish that some of the properties
did not belong to the original sample, or that they were
properties of the original sample not to be generalized to
the kind as a whole’’ (Kripke, 2002, p. 137). That
perspective appears particularly applicable to biology, in
the context of which homeostatic property cluster
natural kinds have a venerable tradition: ‘‘The dispersal
of individuals through smaller or larger portions of the
species rangey places a premium on the existence ofy
species-speciﬁc homeostatic mechanisms’’ (Mayr, 1963,
p. 61) that are responsible for the co-instantiation of
that cluster of properties that mark out the species as a
natural kind (Wilson, 1999). The still controversial
conceptualization of species as natural kinds requires
more discussion than can be pursued in the present
context. However, the homeostatic property cluster
concept of natural kinds is also, and less controversially,
applicable to supraspeciﬁc taxa (Rieppel, 2004b), which
in cladistic analysis most of the time come out with at
least some characters that have an individual consis-
tency index of less than 1.
Natural kind terms allow us to speak about mono-
phyly versus non-monophyly in different terms than is
customary. Monophyletic groups would be things that
exist in nature, i.e. natural kinds. Non-monophyletic
groups are called artifactual by systematists, and thus
are nominal kinds in their view. But non-monophyletic
groups nonetheless exist in nature (e.g. carnivorous
animals, water fowl; Dupre´, 1981, 1993), and may have
explanatory or practical signiﬁcance (e.g., for ecologists
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discourse) of phylogeny reconstruction. Indeed, the
distinction of natural from nominal kinds is often highly
context-dependent, because by virtue of its underlying
causal properties and propensities an individual may
function as a token of more than one natural kind in
different contexts: ‘‘various kinds are natural in different
respects and to different degrees y what is appro-
priately called ‘natural’ varies with the context’’
(LaPorte, 2004, p. 17). Indeed, ‘‘the ‘enthusiasm for
natural kinds’ embodies the realization that there is
more structure in the world than can be captured by a
single taxonomy of nature’’ (Grifﬁths, 1999, p. 217).
Ecological theories admit kinds as natural (‘herbivores’,
‘carnivores’, ‘aquatic mammals’) that have no such
status in phylogeny reconstruction. Natural-kind terms
that apply to non-monophyletic groups can function in
ecological theory construction to the extent that these
groups have theoretical signiﬁcance and explanatory
value, i.e. to the extent that their members play a role in
causal processes. This is what endows the corresponding
kind terms with counterfactual force. ‘Gramineae’ is a
natural-kind term that applies to a monophyletic group
of plants. In contrast, ‘grassland’ is an ecological term
that applies not to a monophyletic group but to a kind
of vegetation, which nevertheless played an important
causal role in the evolution of horses.
Hennig (1950, 1953; for discussion see Rieppel, 2003c)
recognized the context dependence of different classiﬁ-
cations, but he insisted that phylogenetic systematics
must decide, a priori, on a single ﬁrst principle by which
to carve the world up into natural groups, and on that
principle being phylogeny, which in his view is a process
that is isomorphic to the division hierarchy (Hennig,
1957). Under that umbrella, only species and mono-
phyletic taxa can be admitted as natural kinds. But it
must be recognized that this umbrella obtains from an a-
priori decision, one that can be justiﬁed (see below), but
that nevertheless represents a conventionalist compo-
nent in systematics (Rieppel, 2004a).Putting predicates and causes together
Natural kind terms have counterfactual force that
comes in degrees (Grifﬁths, 1999). As mentioned above,
the concept of truth adopted by metaphysical realism is
not an epistemic notion of truth. A sentence (in logic or
mathematics) whose truth condition is satisﬁed ex-
presses objective knowledge. In the context of the
epistemological ‘justiﬁcation project’ (Kirkham, 2001)
that is part of scientiﬁc realism, ‘‘a true belief counts as
knowledge only if it is justiﬁed’’ (Devitt and Sterelny,
1999, p. 47). The question that therefore arises is
(Carnap, 1997, p. 967, italics set here for emphasis):
‘‘To which degree are we rationally entitled to believe’’that p (where p stands for a proposition). Extending the
same argument to phylogenetic systematics, the question
should not be whether a group (‘kind’) is real (natural
kind) or artiﬁcial (nominal kind). Scientiﬁc realists
believe that empirical science can approximate reality,
but it cannot take possession of it. Instead, the question
should be to which degree we are rationally justiﬁed to
believe that group p is monophyletic (is a natural kind);
that degree of justiﬁcation will be issued in terms of
probability. Some authors deny probability statements
any signiﬁcance in phylogeny reconstruction on the
grounds that phylogeny is an historically unique process
(e.g., Kluge, 2002), but here again one must distinguish
the metaphysical from the epistemological project
(Kirkham, 2001). It is one thing to assume reality of a
unique historical process outside of mind and discourse
(as realists do), but another to issue knowledge claims
about this process that are rooted in empirical investiga-
tion. ‘‘Even when the probability of a phylogenetic
hypothesis is unknown, there may be another property
of it that is in plain sight: the likelihood of a hypothesis,
relative to a set of observations, is the probability that
the hypothesis confers on the observations’’ (Sober,
1985, p. 212). For Kluge and Strauss (1985, p. 251) this
means that ‘‘parsimonious genealogies are those best
supported by character distributions, and the likelihood
of a genealogical hypothesis obtains from the prob-
ability it confers on the evolutionary transformation of
characters’’.
Following the principle of total evidence (Kluge,
1989; for discussion see Rieppel, 2003c, 2004b), it is
generally believed that the ‘degree of conﬁrmation’
(Carnap, 1997) will increase with an increasing number
of congruent characters. As stated above, characters
that systematists talk about are rendered in character
statements (propositions about shared characters), and
congruence results from the coherence of logically
independent character statements. Nixon and Carpenter
(1996, p. 237, italics set here for emphasis) found that
‘‘simultaneous analysis y produces the best-supported
hypotheses’’. However, counterfactual force is rooted in
causal relations, not merely in the coherence of the
largest possible set of coherent (non-contradictory)
character statements. To take mere coherence of
character statements relative to a hierarchy as evidence
of phylogenetic relationships is based on an empirical
presupposition. This is that an increasing number of
coherent character statements relative to a hierarchy
increases the probability that the properties predicated
of organisms by those character statements are inherited
from a common ancestor. This empirical presupposition
in turn depends on a heuristic principle, also known as
‘Hennig’s auxiliary principle’: always assume homology
in the absence of contrary evidence – the latter being
incoherent (contradictory) character statements. Ac-
cording to Cain (1967, p. 413), this ‘heuristic’ or
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very results we are trying to discover’’.
For natural-kind terms to have counterfactual force,
their causal grounding must be established (Sterelny,
1996). Natural-kind terms are then recognized to apply
to individuals (tokens) that take part in causal processes,
and it is those causal relations that determine the
relatively stable cluster of properties that mark out a
natural kind. For biological natural kinds, causal
relations can be homeostatic (as in Boyd, 1999) and/or
generative (as in Wagner, 2001), but rooted in causal
relations these properties will be dispositional properties
or propensities (Wagner, 2001), and the probability of
the evolutionary transformation of properties therefore
will correspond to a ‘‘realistic or propensity’’ interpreta-
tion of probability (Mahner and Bunge, 1997, 42f). To
causally ground all characters used in phylogenetic
analysis in theories of inheritance and development is an
ideal, of course, but it can be approached at least to
some degree by the use of operational criteria of
homology, which at least to some extent are grounded
in inheritance and ontogeny (for discussion see Rieppel
and Kearney, 2002; Rieppel, 2004b).Conclusions
Natural-kind terms have counterfactual force, but
because the evolutionary process is not subject to
universal laws (for discussion see above, and Rieppel,
2003b), the counterfactual force of those natural-kind
terms that refer to monophyletic groups will come in
degrees. The expectation of cladists is that the counter-
factual force of natural-kind terms that apply to
monophyletic taxa will be greater than that of nom-
inal-kind terms. However, some authors believe that the
grade concept that is acceptable in evolutionary
taxonomy allows relevant biological generalizations
(predictions) that are different from those generated by
the clade concept (Halstead, 1978; LaPorte, 2004).
Although cladism certainly has an edge over evolu-
tionary taxonomy in the context of phylogeny recon-
struction, it is argued that the latter may represent a
more fruitful approach in the context of ecological
investigations (LaPorte, 2004, p. 78). Thus it will be
necessary to assess counterfactual force relative to a
domain of interest.
The phylogenetic system is a hierarchical one, and if
monophyletic taxa are (homeostatic property cluster)
natural kinds, a hierarchy of natural kinds must be
invoked such as the one sketched by Platts (1997). Mayr
(1974, p. 96) complained that ‘‘the number of biological
statements and predictions that can be made for many
holophyletic [meaning monophyletic] groups (like birds
and crocodiles) is often quite minimal’’. Presumably,what he meant to say is that the clade comprising only
crocodiles plus birds allows for fewer generalizations
than the clade that comprises birds only, or the grade
that puts crocodiles with turtles, Sphenodon, and
squamates. The same argument was raised by Halstead
(1978) when he objected to the thesis that the cladogram
which puts the lungﬁsh closer to the cow than to the
trout had greater explanatory value than the recognition
of a grade of ﬁshes. Patterson (cited in Clouthier and
Ahlberg, 1996, p. 445) insisted that a lungﬁsh shares
more characters with a cow than with a salmon, which is
true, but considering the explanatory value of a clade
comprising crocodiles and birds, Mayr (1974, p. 96)
added that it may ultimately consist ‘‘only of a list of
synapomorphies’’.
While it is true that fewer generalizations apply across
a clade that comprises crocodiles and birds than across a
clade that comprises birds only, this is not a defect of
cladistic phylogeny reconstruction, but an effect of the
hierarchical structure of genealogy: birds are nested
within theropod dinosaurs, the latter are nested within
archosaurs (which also include crocodiles), archosaurs
are nested within diapsid reptiles, and so on. In his
sketch of a hierarchy of natural kinds, Platts (1997)
distinguished between explanatory range and explana-
tory force, and found the latter to increase as the former
decreases. The explanatory force over birds is greater,
but over a smaller explanatory range, than the
explanatory force over reptiles (sauropsids), which is
smaller but covers a broader explanatory range. The
reason is that generalizations over birds are possible
with respect not only to the underlying causal properties
and propensities shared by all birds, but also with
respect to the properties that birds share with all the
higher-level kinds within which they are nested. The
same relationship does not work the other way around.
It is the hierachical structure of genealogy that
explains the importance of ‘genealogical kinds’, i.e.
monophyletic groups (qua homeostatic property cluster
kinds) relative to ‘ecological kinds’ such as ‘carnivores’
and ‘herbivores’. There certainly is a functional dimen-
sion to such ‘ecological kinds’, but these are non-
monophyletic groups that lack an historical dimension.
Non-monophyletic groups can have explanatory sig-
niﬁcance in certain local domains of biology, but it is the
historical dimension of the (homeostatic property
cluster) natural kinds that form the nested hierarchy of
monophyletic taxa which provides the opportunity of
generalization over an increasingly broad explanatory
range, even if with decreasing explanatory force (as
exceptions to the rule are likely to increase). Darwin
(1859, p. 206) acknowledged ‘‘that all organic beings
have been formed on two great laws – Unity of Type
and the Conditions of Existence’’. In the same spirit,
Brooks and McLennan (1991) argued for an integration
of phylogenetic and environmental considerations in
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again, Sterelny and Grifﬁths (1999, p. 379) concluded
that ‘‘nothing in biology makes sense except in the
context of its place in phylogeny’’, for which reason they
postulate a ‘‘foundational role of systematics’’ for all
ﬁelds of evolutionary biology. As Hennig (1950, 1966)
had emphasized: ecologists, population biologists, bio-
geographers, etc., may carve up the world in different
ways in their search for causal relations, but ultimately
all these systems relate back to the one he considered to
be the most fundamental one – the phylogenetic system.Acknowledgements
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